Some Ideas on the possible application of Game Theory in exploring the lifting of the US embargo on Cuba

As I mentioned in a past blog post, there has been a lot of banter about the current restoration of diplomatic relations with the nation of Cuba. This post concerns something else that has been on my mind the last couple of weeks. It is probable application of game theory towards the field of international economics. Game theory is already used most intensively in several branches of economics (industrial organization, behavioral economics, information economics, political economy), but there's a lack of full application in other branches of economics such as international economics.

I have been intensely reading parts of a book by the late Stanford economics professor, John McMillan. The book goes through the lack of game theory application, despite obvious game theory-like applications within international economics. This book had given me several ideas on the possible wider probable usage of certain mathematical games within the fixture of game theory in order to be applied in the inner-working of international economics, especially in international trade. By utilizing the trade between Cuba and US as a possible example, we could possibly apply game theory to the increased link between the two countries versus the chief adversary of the US in Russia. Here are some possible applications that can be utilized, which also includes some articles on similar topics that I found, which had given me the impetus to write this article.

1. Embargo or No embargo payoff
By utilizing the simple stochastic multi-player games, we can determine payoff costs by comparing the embargo or no embargo payoff between the two different multi-layer outcomes of (Embargo) or (No Embargo). This is a rather simplistic explanation of such a multi-player stochastic game that we will need to construct in order to measure the payoffs in of the each quadrants, but there might be a need to construct algorithmic stochastic multi-player games. This need is not just based on the complexity of the variables, but also on the need to have more well-defined variables, especially when it comes to find the advantages to each variable. To further explore the information, you need to perhaps construct a more complex model, with the help of computer software, in which there needs to be a various number of factors included. These factors include the trade flow variables, the number of zero-sum games and cooperative games performed in each of the variables, etc. There needs to be a construction of a model that is complex enough to find the actual numbers of payoffs for each of the two factors, but I'm sure it'll indicate that the

This article by Professor Dobre Claudia Ioana strikes to me as an interesting implication of certain principles within the mathematical realm of game theory to something found in international economics -> international trade. It also has given me some impetus in coming up with the idea of implicating the methods of game theory in dealing with rather complex trade relations between the countries of Cuba and the US. By utilizing the basic idea around Part 2.3 of the article, we can calculate for the strategic trading policies that could potentially benefit both Cuba and the US. In this simplified case, we can solve for the Nash equilibrium within the confines of a non-cooperative game, the payoffs are as follows:

1. If Cuba does want to open up, the US wants to retain the trade embargo.
2. If Cuba does want to open up, the US removes the trade embargo, the US places favorable conditions for Cuba.
3. If Cuba does want to open up, the US removes the trade embargo and the US places unfavorable conditions for Cuba.

This is just the basic approach to the multi-faceted approach to determining the payoffs and the Nash equilibrium for this particular international trade situation. These are just some ideas of a possible design that could be brought forth and I'm still currently thinking about the various formulas and variables that could be realized to achieve a full and sustained approach to developing a solution to the problem.

2. Extensive Form Games
Another factor that should possibly be calculated is how the United States has to deal with how Russia responds to Cuba and vice versa. This particular situation can be characterized as a multi-player game where we need to figure out the payoffs and similar equilibriums. In this situation, we could potentially utilize extensive form games to factor each of the important factors between these three competing nations. It might be hard to characterize entire large economies as a single one micro body/ individual, but I believe that it can be surmised that all of these countries act as one single body.

The first series of extensive form games you could possibly calculate for certain payoffs between US-Cuba and between Russia-Cuba. By factoring the payoff decision-making numbers of this series of extensive form games (factors including certain firms, certain economic sectors, certain competitive indicators), you could potentially compare the numerical payoffs in each of these insistences.

After this, you could potentially utilize a second series of extensive form games to calculate the numerical payoff results that are resultant from the previous extensive form game. The numerical payoffs, along with certain control variables such as competitive advantage, gains/losses from trade and other indicators, are then calculated to determine whether or not the options are valid through the applicability of such a model.

The calculated effects on Cuba's trade policies in certain segments of their economy and the US economy could potentially benefit the US tremendously in that particular arena versus what the main US adversary has, which is Russia. By calculating for the potential benefits/pitfalls from them, one could be derive a simulation for a potential new international trade model.

(An introduction to Extensive Form games is found here, written/presented by Jonathan Levin, the winner of the 2011 John Bates Clark medal. These explanations are mostly meant for his field of concentration, which is industrial organization, but I think it gives a good idea of what extensive form games are.)

I believe the ideas that Professor Dobre Claudia Ioana and the late Professor John McMillan brought up offers a lot of hope for game theory to become a great potential tool for international economics/international trade researchers to continue to build onto. There could be lots of different ways to utilize these tools in its eventual development into useful tools for analyses of complex international trade situations/conflicts, such as that in this particular situation.